

Ch. 3 Neoliberal School Reform in Chicago?
Renaissance 2010, Portfolios of Schools, and Diverse Providers
David Menefee-Libey

55.1a	Renaissance 2010	New initiative they proclaim as a way to replace worst performing schools
55.1b		Offered new choices and instructional programs
56.1a	Ren10 policies	Test-based accountability
56.1b		Creation of charter schools
56.1c		Establish contract schools
56.1d		Human capital initiatives
56.3a	Political challenges	Confirms importance of the civic committee of Chicago
56.3b		Solidified Mayor Daly's control over CPS
57.1a	Diverse Portfolio	A blending of public and private provision for students and differentiation of entrepreneurial schools
57.1b		New governance or a neo-liberal policy approach
58.1a	Waves of School Reform	CPS does not perform at an acceptable level
58.1b		School's System leaders proved incapable of reforming
58.2a	CPS	3 rd largest school system in U.S. (STATS)
59.1a	Table 3.1	Chicago Public Schools by Type
59.2a	Wave One	Chicago School Reform Act of 1988
59.2b		Public frustration with poor school quality
60.1a	Creation of elected LSC	Empowered to choose school's principal and create a school improvement plan
60.1b		Enable parents, teachers and principals to develop an autonomous school educational program best suited to the needs of local children
60.2a	CPS Central Office	Developed an elaborate system of oversight for LCS's and schools
61.1a	CCSR created	Consortium of Chicago School Research – developed substantial policy and evaluation; created by colleges and universities
61.2a	Daley's relations with the LSCs	Daley began working to preempt a development of an LSC power base that might challenge his control
61.2b	First Wave	Brought substantial school-focused innovation and development
62.1a	Wave Two: Mayoral Control	Gave Daley the power to appoint the district superintendent and a smaller school reform board
62.1b		Reduced CTU influence in the district
62.1c		Freed CPS to contract out almost any type of service
62.2a	Daley's New Authority	Brought a bottom-line business orientation to the

		district's management
62.2b		Ultimately contracted out services for entire schools
62.3a	Superintendent Vallas and boundaries	Limits were placed on LSC's autonomy making it conditional on the performance of schools
63.1a	Accountability	Remain central to Vallas's vision for system improvement
63.2a	Daley and Vallas Vision	Reinvention of schools themselves
63.2b		Create more effective instruction
63.3a	Charter Schools	Allowed the creation of 45 charter schools state-wide, including 1 in Chicago

63.3a	Charter Schools	Allowed the creation of 45 charter schools state-wide, including 1 in Chicago
63.3b	Daley's view on charter schools	Saw charter schools as a tool for injecting innovation and improvement into the public school system
64.1a	Charter School Cap	A new category of schools was born – contract schools
64.2a	Martin (Mike) Koldyke	Set out to create his own teacher training school for career changers
64.2b	Chicago Academy	CPS school was staffed by teachers who included the trainers and trainees of a teacher academy
64.3a	Multi-School Campus	Charters should be allowed to replicate its models on multiple campuses
65.1a	CICS, Learn	Replication campuses
66.1a	Logic of confidence	Good practice brings about good results
66.1b	Logic of Accountability	Educators must move to a more business-oriented logic of accountability
66.2a	Vallas resigns	Vallas's patience and support for Daley gradually waned
66.3a	Wave three	Duncan and Differentiated schools
66.4a	Vallas's Reform	Duncan carried Vallas's reforms of the district
67.1a	Ariel Community Academy	Magnet school
67.1b		Every school, every child education plan
67.2a	Ren10 creation	Elements of the new school plan are borrowed from Boston and NY
67.3a	Philanthropic Initiatives	Laid the ground work for Renaissance 2010
68.3a	Renaissance 2010	At its core, it attempts to draw together school evaluation, school closing and the creation of new schools in new and coordinated ways in order to spur continuous improvement
69.1a	Portfolio Management District	Takes a strategic approach by focusing on the school, not the district, not the curriculum, not the classroom or the teacher as the locus of educational improvement
69.2a	PMD must do four things:	Evaluate schools by some degree on attendance, curricular or school completion, testing or anything else required by the district
69.2b		Differentiate its handling of schools based on the evaluation outcomes

69.2c		Close schools that persistently fail
69.2d		enable the creation of new schools
70.1a	School Evaluations	Illinois has struggled with school evaluations for decades
70.1b	CPS creates evaluation indicators for three purposes	Information of school improvement
70.1c		District evaluation of schools
70.1d		Evaluations of schools and educational options
71.2a	School Differentiation, Positive and Negative	District worked to create tiers of autonomy and interventions for schools
71.2b		Schools performing satisfactory would be treated differently from underperforming schools
72.1a	Steps to School Intervention	Identify unsatisfactory schools How far to go with intervention How to handle school closings
72.3a	School Interventions and Closings	Part of the problem with interventions was a lack of clarity in the theory of action
72.3b		Schools often perform badly because their leadership and/or teachers were dysfunctional
73.3a	School closings	The most draconian response to poor school performance was closing
72.3b	Two reasons for closing	Low enrolment or low academic performance
74.1a	Roman Catholic Schools	Drew more than a ¼ of all enrollment
74.2a	Daley and Duncan's promise	Promised to close up to 60 schools for underperformance
74.3a	Manipulation of data	Accusations were made that the district had manipulated enrollment and test scores to close schools
74.4a	Closure rules	More specific and transparent rules were established in 2009
75.2a	New Schools	School closures were only a small part of Ren10
75.2b		There was a focus of renewal with the creation of 100 new schools
75.4a	New School openings	Have broken the traditional mold and blended public and private provision
76.1a	Charter Schools	Contrary to the original plan the most common path to new school creation was charter schools
76.1b		A substantial amount of charters were in place way before Ren10 was launched
77.2a	Charter school problems	Location and facilities challenge
77.2b		Enrollment challenge
78.1a	New Leaders for new schools	Help prepare principals run the proposed schools
78.2a	Application Process for opening charters	Submit proposals which included academic plans, business plans, facility plans and enrollment areas
78.3a	Contract schools	The desire to expand the number of charter schools beyond state-imposed caps led to contract schools
78.3b		Contract schools did not follow a single path and did not share a common description
78.4a		Resemble charters in some ways
78.4b		Run by non-profit organizations with their own boards

78.5a	Contract vs Charter	Charter schools are required to enroll all students that apply
78.5b		Contract schools are selective
79.1		Contract schools lack some of charter school's autonomy from district policies
79.3a	Performance schools	Similar to charters and contract schools in some ways operating as small campuses with focused and innovative academic missions
79.3b		Run by local leaders chosen by the districts
79.3c		Students enrolled by application
79.4a		Part of CPS
79.4b		Teachers are part of CPS and union
80.3	Related Policies	Duncan created the related policies for the Autonomous Schools Office
80.4a	Quality Staff in Differentiated Schools	The district lacked administrators and teachers with necessary skills to run differentiated schools
81.2a	New Teacher Project	Groups worked together to expand the pool of high quality teachers
82.2a	Huberman	Secretary of Education; no experience as an educator
		Laid out a careful managerial and data focused strategy
83.1a	"Still Left Behind"	Research shows that many school under Ren10 underserve poor and minority children
83.2a	Implementation Problems for Ren10	Unsolved problems include sustaining and growing the pool of charter providers in the city, and creating the supports and transparency necessary for parental choice in the district
83.3a	Diffusion of innovation	Idea that communication and collaboration among successful people inside and outside CPSs will encourage the creation of new schools and better educational practices
84.2a	Reaching Parents	Distrust in many quarters about the leadership's interest in poor children

83.1a	"Still Left Behind"	Research shows that many school under Ren10 underserve poor and minority children
83.2a	Implementation Problems for Ren10	Unsolved problems include sustaining and growing the pool of charter providers in the city, and creating the supports and transparency necessary for parental choice in the district
83.3a	Diffusion of innovation	Idea that communication and collaboration among successful people inside and outside CPSs will encourage the creation of new schools and better educational practices
84.2a	Reaching Parents	Distrust in many quarters about the leadership's interest in poor children
84.3a		Not enough information about school types
84.4a	Daley's Political Program	Ren10 is not only educational policy but also a core component of Daley's political program
85.2a		Weakened the CTU
85.3a		Beholden to the city's business leadership and affluent and middle-class constituents
86.2a		Ren10 is less an education reform initiative than a

		power grab hostile to the interest of low income people
86.4a	Portfolio Reform, Neoliberalism	Focused on state's improving curricular standards and graduation requirements
86.4b		Restructuring focused on the school as the locus of educational improvement
87.1a		Move toward test-based accountability and school report cards
87.2a	New Governance	Managerial view of educational improvement
87.3a	Neoliberal policy	Led by professionals from outside the conventional world of educational policy
88.2a	Portfolio District	Diverse and multi-dimensional approaches contrary to standardized assessments and interventions of Ren10
88.3a	Strategic Ambiguity	Focus on data-driven school improvement requires a narrowing of educational goals
89.4a	District leaders in Chicago bring together two things:	a new, simplified bottom line
89.4b		A new governance approach to managing the district to maximize the bottom line
89.4c		Indicators for school performance in Chicago are all about performance management, to drive up those indicators
90..2	Political limits of Neoliberalism	Portfolio strategy transforms school districts in ways that upset established patterns, threaten many groups, create the need for kinds of expertise not traditionally used in public education, and render some forms of expertise obsolete
90.3a	In actual practice	The resulting education system in Chicago may well be less accountable to the public and less transparent to children and parents seeking the best possible schools